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Palermo, Italy, 
erica.mazzola@unipa.it ,  mariangela.piazza@unipa.it , giovanni.perrone@unipa.it  
 




The need to solve innovation problems and insource knowledge has led to an increasing number 
of organizations engaging in crowdsourcing activities and subsequently establishing working 
relationships with winning solution providers. Using a knowledge-based view and the problem-
solving perspective, we develop a theoretical framework suggesting how specific innovation 
problem attributes, i.e., the decomposability, formulation and search space of the problem, 
influence the governance decision (unilateral vs. bilateral) of seekers to manage the relationship 
with winning solvers. We empirically analyze the framework using 582 challenges broadcast 
on the NineSigma crowdsourcing platform. Our results indicate that problem attributes – the 
formulation and search space of problem – have a positive effect on seekers’ preference toward 
unilateral governance structures. However, we did not find empirical confirmation of the effect 
that the decomposability of the innovation problem has on seekers’ preference toward unilateral 
governance structures. This study offers several contributions to the crowdsourcing literature, 
and it also has important implications for managers of organizations aiming at insourcing 
knowledge through crowdsourcing for innovation contests. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As more organizations access external knowledge, open up their boundaries and engage 
in crowdsourcing for innovation contests, determining how to govern the working relationships 
with external solution providers has increasingly become strategically important (Majchrzak 
and Malhotra, 2013; Lüttgens et al., 2014). For example, if organizations perform poorly in 
choosing the structure of the working relationship, it may result in missed opportunities and 
wasted resources due to delays in the new product development process and a decrease in 
innovation outcome rates (Sampson, 2004; Stanko and Calantone, 2011). Further, choosing 
inappropriate governance structures may also lower the revenues of future contests, since an 
unfair and poorly designed crowdsourcing contest may damage the company’s reputation (de 
Beer et al., 2017). Accordingly, deepening the understanding of the governance structure of the 
working relationship between organizations and solution providers is vital for organizations 
looking for appropriate relationships that may increase the value of their crowdsourcing 
initiatives.  
Organizations (i.e., seekers) that wish to solve a given innovation problem are searching 
for external providers (i.e., solvers) that possess particular know-how to join in a working 
relationship (i.e., governance structure decision) and implement the best solutions (Lüttgens et 
al., 2014). When crowdsourcing innovation problems, the seeker must still take several 
decisions such as whether to proceed with an external crowdsourcing platform instead of an 
internal one, and how to organize the knowledge sharing and transfer of intellectual property 
related to the winning solution (de Beer et al., 2017; Schenk et al., 2017). To date, how seekers 
can insource new knowledge from winning solvers by establishing an appropriate working 
relationship remains a neglected area of research. This relationship ranges from unilateral (e.g., 
licensing arrangements and research contracts) to bilateral relationships (e.g., technology 
partnerships, cross-licensing agreements, and joint ventures) (Hagedoorn, 1990; Leonard- 
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Barton, 1995). In particular, a related question has been overlooked: what influences seekers in 
deciding the governance structure of the working relationship they will establish with the 
winning solver?  
As previous scholars have empirically shown, the attributes of the problems may attract 
or inhibit potential solvers to participate in the innovation contests, thereby influencing the 
overall performance of the challenge (Terwiesch and Xu, 2008; Jeppesen and Lakhani, 2010; 
Boudreau et al., 2011; Franke et al., 2013). These attributes, which are more complex than 
technical indications favoring the use of new ideas or solutions to innovation problems, depend 
on the nature of the problem and the knowledge requirements of the solver. The seeker-
preferred governance structure is then pushed forward when the combination of these attributes 
yields solutions that exceed the expectations generated by the solver’s experiences. The 
challenge attributes, therefore, play a critical role, not only in gaining new knowledge from 
outsiders and attracting solvers but also in defining governance structures. Thus, the aim of the 
paper is to fill the previous gap and answer the research question by investigating whether and 
how the problem attributes affect the seeker’s governance preferences under alternative 
governance structures, both unilateral and bilateral (Afuah and Tucci, 2012; Lüttgens et al., 
2014; Nickerson et al., 2017).  
An organization’s level of knowledge access is a key driver of competitive advantage 
and organizational capacity (Easterby-Smith and Prieto, 2008); the knowledge-based view of 
the firm examines the ways in which organizations can increase this level (Grant, 1996; Kogut 
and Zander, 1992). Within the framework of the knowledge-based view of the firm, research 
has explored how knowledge considerations impact the type of alliance chosen (e.g., Gulati and 
Singh, 1998), the management of partners (e.g. Dimitratos et al., 2010), the integration of 
knowledge in the crowd context (e.g., Malhotra and Majchrzak, 2014) and the connection 
between the type of governance chosen and the problem-solving context (e.g., Felin and Zenger, 
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2014; Nickerson et al., 2017). We grounded the development of our model in the knowledge-
based view of the firm (Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992) positing that the seeker’s 
knowledge-based objective is to insource valuable new knowledge from the crowd. The seeker, 
however, cannot simply choose a problem and ask for the new knowledge to be acquired 
because the desired knowledge is frequently hard to communicate or has not been developed 
yet (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004). Instead, seekers must define valuable problems that, through 
their attributes, formalize the knowledge required. Such problem attributes, i.e., 
decomposability, formulation and search space of the problem (Afuah and Tucci, 2012; 
Natalicchio et al., 2017), are the means through which a seeker can solicit knowledge from the 
crowd. Thus, when deciding about the governance structure of the working relationship, seekers 
adopt a problem-solving perspective (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004). They rely on the attributes 
of the problem they would like to solve and match these attributes with governance modes that 
allow them to better acquire the related knowledge from the crowd (Nickerson et al., 2017). As 
such, we integrate the problem-solving perspective and the knowledge-based view of the firm 
(Kogut and Zander, 1992; Grant, 1996; Nickerson and Zenger, 2004; Nickerson et al., 2017) 
and provide matching arguments between problems, which vary according to their attributes, 
and crowdsourcing relationships, which vary according to their governance structures.  
To empirically investigate the effect that innovation problem attributes have on seeker 
preferences in governance structures, we chose the NineSigma crowdsourcing platform. 
Collecting a distinctive dataset of 582 challenges broadcast from 2010 to 2014, we tested the 
hypotheses related to the seeker knowledge-based governance considerations. Moreover, since 
our empirical setting presents some specificities, we conducted exploratory interviews to 




CROWDSOURCING FOR INNOVATION IN THE NINESIGMA PLATFORM 
In this paper, we particularly refer to the NineSigma platform since, in contrast to other 
crowdsourcing platforms in which winning solvers receive a monetary prize for selling their IP 
outright (e.g., InnoCentive), NineSigma allows seekers and solvers to engage in a working 
relationship, e.g., licensing and co-development (Katzy et al., 2013; Lopez-Vega et al., 2016). 
Given the specificities of the empirical setting, we deepen our understanding of the 
crowdsourcing for innovation context by conducting exploratory interviews in December  2016. 
One of the author conducted interviews with two multinational companies, located in Scotland 
here named for reasons of confidentiality FirmA and FirmB that engaged in crowdsourcing 
activities through the NineSigma platform. The interviews were concerned with an in-depth 
comprehension of the governance considerations related to the relationship with the solvers, the 
support offered by the platform during the contest, and the role played by the attributes of the 
problem in this context. Moreover, we also interviewed a NineSigma program manager, whose 
role is to support seeker companies during the crowdsourcing process.  
On the NineSigma platform, the challenges are broadcast through a problem statement 
called a Request for Proposal (RFP) (Lüttgens et al., 2014). In the RFP seekers describe the 
attributes of the innovation problem to be solved and inform potential solvers of the governance 
structures that will regulate the working relationship between the seeker and the winning solver 
(Franke et al., 2013; Lopez-Vega et al., 2016; de Beer et al., 2017). FirmA stressed the 
importance of declaring the preferred governance structure in the RFP: 
[…] We feel we need to be prepared for that because the last thing we want is to have an amazing proposal 
and then we say “sorry, you could probably solve our challenge but the contract that we want to put in 
place is different to what you want.” So, we need to be very careful about that.  
The seeker-solver working relationship can be managed through different forms of governance 
structures. Specifically, governance forms to manage the working relationships can range from 
unilateral (e.g., a licensing agreement) to bilateral (e.g., a joint development agreement) 
governance structures. This was confirmed by the interviews with FirmA manager:  
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[…] Sometimes we’re looking for a readymade solution in which case we are just looking for a supply 
agreement. If there’s a challenge that we know there must be a solution to, maybe it’s a material challenge 
and we’re just looking for a hard material we’ll just say “you can supply us; we’ll pay you…” and we’ll 
make an agreement of how much we’re going to pay for the bulk material or doing the process. 
[…] If it’s something a bit more out there and we’re looking for something that’s a bit maybe not 
developed and we’re looking for ideas, then we’ll have two or three options about how we work on it. 
One is that we support the research, so we’ll give them some laboratory space or field testing or some 
engineering time to help them out, or we’ll go onto a joint development agreement where we’ll pay a lot 
of it but we expect then a portion of the IP. 
The formulation of the RFP is an important step for firms engaging in crowdsourcing activities 
in order to find valuable knowledge since it may affect the output of the contest (Sieg et al., 
2010). Thus, NineSigma managers offer their support and work closely with their seeker clients 
to help them write the RFPs (Lopez-Vega et al., 2016; Natalicchio et al., 2017). The following 
quote from the NineSigma program manager nicely captures the role of the platform in 
supporting the seeker writing the RFP: 
[…] we try to write technology searches in such a way that our external community can understand the 
problem. […] It’s about what is the actual technology problem, what is it you’re looking for and that is a 
really difficult technique to do and most clients don’t do it very well. 
The support offered by NineSigma to seekers in managing every stage of the challenge, from 
the design of the RFP to the contracting of the working relationship, is also highlighted by 
FirmB: 
[…] They will also provide support in terms of if we need to set up the challenge then we can get their 
support to define what we really want, how we’re going to get that, how we are going to find that and 
then how we’re going to manage it when it comes back to us.  
Finally, when the firms were asked about what they consider valuable in thinking about the 
governance form of the working relationship to establish with the winning solver, the director 
of innovation for FirmA clearly said: 
[…] Arrangements depend on where the challenges come from and the characteristics of problems. 
Thus, the importance of the innovation problem’s attributes emerged as a significant factor in 
considering the governance structure of crowdsourcing in order to insource the knowledge 
related to the solutions. We, thus, start from these evidences to investigate the role played by 
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problem attributes in affecting a seeker’s governance preferences under alternative governance 
structures, both unilateral and bilateral. 
 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 Adopting a problem-solving perspective, we focus on the problem as our central unit of 
analysis and hypothesize that problem attributes related to the desirable knowledge guide the 
seeker in crowdsourcing relationship governance considerations (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004; 
Nickerson et al., 2017). As showed in Figure 1, our effort is to match problem attributes with 
governance forms that differently support knowledge insourcing. To enable this matching, and 
consistent with prior work, we argue that three key characteristics of problems influence 
seekers’ knowledge-based governance considerations: the decomposability, the formulation, 
and the search space of the problem broadcast (Afuah and Tucci, 2012; Felin and Zenger, 2014; 
Natalicchio et al., 2017).  
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual framework 
 
Decomposability of the problem 
The decomposability of the problem is defined as the number of knowledge elements 
that compose the innovation problem and the number of interdependencies among them 
(Casciaro, 2003; Afuah and Tucci, 2012; Kosonen and Henttonen, 2014). Problems could range 
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from being high-decomposable (i.e., suitable modularity, known knowledge elements, or 
explicit knowledge required with less interaction with partners) to low-decomposable (i.e., less 
modularity, unknown knowledge elements, or requiring a high level of interactions) (Nickerson 
and Zenger, 2004; Jeppesen and Lakhani, 2010). The level to which a problem can be 
decomposed into smaller knowledge components (i.e., the structure of the problem) allows 
solvers to utilize their expertise to independently solve subsets of the larger problem (Jeppesen 
and Lakhani, 2010). Thus, unlike high-decomposable problems, low-decomposable problems 
are prone to unexpected or unknown interactions among knowledge sets potentially required to 
formulate a solution.  
The degree of problem decomposability is the consideration that Nickerson and Zenger 
(2014) employ to match problem types to governance forms. They suggest that a problem that 
is high-decomposable is more amenable to a market-based problem-solving approach (i.e., 
unilateral governance structures) because it requires a more clear process to formulate the 
solution and an extensive knowledge sharing is not needed. In such a case, the resolution of 
high-decomposable problems requires solvers to perform a sequential choices process that has 
to deal with clear and simple information processing coming from few or even a unique 
knowledge element and that seekers can easier assess (Afuah and Tucci, 2012; Natalicchio et 
al., 2017). Moreover, since the knowledge related to high-decomposable problems can be easily 
embedded into a product or a service, seekers can more easily assess the resolution process by 
evaluating the quality and efficacy of a product or service (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Casciaro, 
2003). Assessing and understanding the resolution process of high-decomposable problems, 
thus, do not require seekers to strictly work with the winning solvers (Felin and Zenger, 2014). 
Then, seeker can economize the knowledge transfer, building a seeker-solver relationship with 
a unilateral governance structure requiring a level of investment that is lower than that required 
by bilateral ones (Hsieh et al., 2007). Unilateral governance structures are indeed more efficient 
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to deal with high-decomposable problems since they do not require an onerous formal system 
for communication and joint decision making, which is not necessary for evaluating and 
transferring the knowledge in such a case (Casciaro, 2003).  
On the other hand, engaging in a relationship with a bilateral governance structure, 
seekers can strictly cooperate with the winning solver and set-up a specific common language 
that allows them to overcome the difficulties arising from the exchange of several and 
interdependent knowledge elements (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004). Moreover, when a seeker 
can work more closely with the winning solver, the flow of detailed and specialized knowledge 
concerning the value of the solution transferred overcomes the intrinsic difficulties of 
evaluating the nature of problems with a low level of decomposability (Gulati and Singh, 1998; 
Felin and Zenger, 2014).  
In sum, more complex and onerous bilateral governance structures can better support 
seekers to insource knowledge related to the solution of problems with a low level of 
decomposability, whereas the less costly and simpler unilateral governance structures are more 
efficient in transferring knowledge related to the solution of problems with a high level of 
decomposability.  As a result, the degree of problem decomposability seems to be a convincing 
driver of keeping different governance structure options open. The decomposability of the 
problem allows seekers to use more market-based problem-solving governance structures (i.e., 
unilateral structures) because it provides a clear solution criterion with a low level of 
complexity.   
Accordingly, we posit the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: High-decomposable (low-decomposable) innovation problems are positively 
related with the seeker’s preference toward unilateral (bilateral) governance structures. 
 
Formulation of the problem 
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Once a problem to broadcast has been identified, seekers have to formulate it by 
describing the requirements that the desired solution must fulfil (Afuah and Tucci, 2012; von 
Hippel and von Krogh, 2015). Because solvers rely exclusively on information provided by 
seekers, the formulation of the problem is a critical step for seeker firms aiming at finding 
valuable solutions (Natalicchio et al., 2017). However, the description of an innovation problem 
is not an easy task and the problems broadcast to the crowd can be well-delineated or poorly-
delineated (Simon, 1962). A problem is poorly-delineated when the seeker fails to communicate 
or describe knowledge elements that are valuable in its resolution (Afuah and Tucci, 2012; 
Natalicchio et al., 2017). The accuracy with which seekers may formulate the problem depends 
on both confidentiality issues and the amount of tacit knowledge connected to the problems, 
i.e., knowledge that cannot be codified or captured in drawings or writing but can only be 
obtained through observation and practical experience (Martin and Salomon, 2003; Nonaka and 
von Krogh, 2009; Sieg et al., 2010; Natalicchio et al., 2017). The formulation of the problem 
may affect the value of the solution proposals. In fact, since solvers may not possess certain 
knowledge elements and cannot follow a formalized and unambiguous problem-solving 
approach, this may lead them to develop poor quality and defective solutions (Fernandes and 
Simon, 1999; von Hippel and von Krogh, 2015).  
We argue that the formulation of the problem impacts the governance structure choice 
of the working relationship, which allows seekers to increase the value of the insourced 
knowledge (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004; Leiblein and Macher, 2009).  
Bilateral governance structures provide seekers with advantages necessary in managing 
poorly-delineated problems by overcoming the deficiencies of the problem formulation (Lam, 
2000; Felin and Zenger, 2014). In fact, bilateral governance structures offer seekers a formal 
system of coordination that allows them to set-up a common language and carefully work with 
the winning solvers (Casciaro, 2003). By establishing such close cooperation, the seeker and 
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solver can share tacit knowledge elements related to the problem through mutual observation 
of their work, compensating for the poor formulation of the problem when it was broadcast 
(Grandori, 2001; Cummings and Teng, 2003; Squire et al., 2009). Moreover, when the seeker 
can closely work with the winning solver, trust arises between them (Moorman et al., 1992; 
Nooteboom, 1996). In such a circumstance when a seeker can rely on trust at the interpersonal 
level, they are more inclined to share elements of knowledge previously omitted in the 
description of the problem due to confidentiality reasons (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004). 
Conversely, since an accurate formulation of the problem increases the value of solution 
proposals, unilateral governance structures may represent a proper choice when broadcasting a 
well-delineated problem (Natalicchio et al., 2017). In such a case, the formulation of the 
innovation problem requires seekers to communicate explicit knowledge that is easy to codify 
by using drawing and writing schemes (Nonaka and von Krogh, 2009). To describe the 
knowledge elements of a well-delineated problem, then, seekers do not need organizational 
mechanisms that allow the sharing of components of tacit knowledge and the development of 
mutual trust (Gulati and Nickerson, 2008). Thus, when broadcasting well-delineated problems, 
seeker can benefit from efficiency related to unilateral governance structures that are simpler 
and less costly due to the less onerous administrative structure (Casciaro, 2003). 
In sum, more complex and onerous bilateral governance structures can better support 
seekers to insource knowledge related to the solution of poorly-delineated problems, whereas 
less costly and simpler unilateral governance structures are more efficient in transferring 
knowledge related to the solution of well-delineated problems.  
In accordance with this reasoning, we posit the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Well-delineated (poorly-delineated) innovation problems are positively related 
with the seeker’s preference toward unilateral (bilateral) governance structures. 
 
 12 
Search space of the problem 
The search space of the problem reflects the bundle of knowledge and fields of expertise 
useful in dealing with its resolution process (March, 1991). Seekers may or may not be familiar 
with the knowledge and expertise that characterize the search space of the problem they 
broadcast (von Hippel, 1994; Lopez-Vega et al., 2016). In particular, when the search space 
overlaps the seekers’ knowledge capabilities, seekers perform local searches aiming at 
insourcing and implementing innovations that are similar to their existing knowledge base 
(March, 1991; Natalicchio et al., 2017). In turn, when the search space of the problem does not 
overlap the seekers’ knowledge capabilities, seekers perform distant searches aiming at 
exploring and absorbing innovations that are different from their existing knowledge base 
(March, 1991; Natalicchio et al., 2017). The search space of the problem influences the 
coordination required between a seeker and solver to understand and transfer the knowledge. 
When problems require a distant searching process, transfer of knowledge is more difficult, 
costly and time consuming, since seekers have to deal with knowledge they are not familiar 
with and may therefore lack the absorptive capacity necessary to assess and insource the 
knowledge related to the solution (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Nooteboom, 2000). Moreover, 
seekers may overvalue the quality of solution proposals, facing the risk of insourcing poor 
quality or even ineffective winning solutions (Afuah and Tucci, 2012; Mayer and Salomon, 
2006).  
We argue that the search space of the problem impacts the governance structure choices 
of the working relationship that supports a seeker in the understanding and insourcing of new 
knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Nickerson and Zenger, 2004).  
Specifically, bilateral governance structures are more beneficial for managing the 
challenging coordination requirements seekers face when the search space of the problem does 
not overlap their knowledge capabilities (Sampson, 2004). Bilateral governance structures are 
 13 
characterized by a set of organizing principles that act as mechanisms by which it is possible to 
codify the knowledge into a language accessible to a wider range of individuals (Kogut and 
Zander, 1992). Thanks to these mechanisms, then, bilateral governance structures make 
transferring and sharing knowledge easier and less costly for a seeker who has to deal with 
distant and unfamiliar knowledge (Conner and Prahalad, 1996). Moreover, when unanticipated 
contingencies occur, bilateral governance structures also provide greater flexibility to 
renegotiate and adapt a relationship than unilateral ones (Conner and Prahalad, 1996). Such 
flexibility is critically required when seekers face distant searches, since they may incur 
renegotiation costs related to learning opportunities and difficulties related to unfamiliar 
knowledge that seekers are not able to foresee (Sampson, 2004).   
Contrarily, when the problem space overlaps the seekers’ knowledge capabilities, 
seekers do not face difficulties in understanding and absorbing the knowledge of the winning 
solution and assessing its quality, so unilateral governance structures might be preferable 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). In such a case, to insource the knowledge elements related to the 
winning solutions, seekers can leverage their existing capabilities and do not need to strictly 
cooperate with solvers to understand the knowledge and build new capabilities (Kogut and 
Zender, 1992; Sampson, 2004). Thus, when broadcasting problems with a near search space, 
seekers can exploit the efficiency of less costly unilateral governance structures that are indeed 
less committed and can offer to the solver a level of investment that is commensurate with what 
the innovation problem requires (Contractor and Ra, 2002; Casciaro, 2003). 
In sum, more complex and onerous bilateral governance structures can better support 
seekers in insourcing knowledge related to the solution of problems with a distant search space; 
whereas, less costly and simpler unilateral governance structures are more efficient in 
transferring knowledge related to the solution of problems with a near search space.  
Accordingly, we posit the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 3: Innovation problems with a distant search (near search) space are negatively 
related with the seeker’s preference toward unilateral (bilateral) governance structures. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Data collection and measures 
To test our hypotheses, we built an ad-hoc database considering all the crowdsourcing 
for innovation contests broadcast on NineSigma (Lopez-Vega et al., 2016) in a five-year time 
window (2010-2014). Data are collected from the RFP documents, and the contest is the unit 
of analysis. Each observation is fixed at the date of submission and does not require a study 
across time; the dataset is then structured as cross-sectional. During our observation period, 787 
crowdsourcing for innovation contests were broadcast on the platform; however, some 
observations were removed because following an update to the platform’s archive, some RFP 
documents were not available. The final sample consists of 582 challenges.  
The variable Unilateral governance structure measures the governance structure 
preferred by the seeker to manage the working relationship with the winning solver. The seeker 
can propose one or more governance structures, and they range from unilateral (i.e., licensing 
agreements, technology/patent/product acquisition, consulting, supply agreements and 
contracted research) to bilateral (i.e., joint development and partnerships). If in the RFP 
document a seeker proposes only a type of unilateral governance structure (or even more than 
one), she/he has a preference toward unilateral governance structures. Instead, if the seeker 
proposes only a type of bilateral governance structure (or even more than one), or if the seeker 
proposes both unilateral and bilateral governance structures, she/he does not have any 
preference toward unilateral governance structures. Thus Unilateral governance structure is 
modeled as a binary variable, assuming the value 1 if the seeker has a preference toward 
unilateral governance structures, 0 otherwise.  
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The explanatory variable Decomposability of the problem is a count variable measuring 
the number of technical areas (e.g., engineering, chemistry or healthcare science) to which the 
problem can be decomposed, as described in the RFP (Natalicchio et al.,2017). For example, 
considering the problem related the development of a system to improve visibility during bad 
weather (NineSigma, 2012 – ID challenge REQ9172895) that involved several and distinct 
knowledge elements, ranging from mechanical engineering, electrical/electronic engineering to 
information science, the variable Decomposability assumes a value equal to 3.  
 Formulation of the problem is operationalized as a count variable measuring the 
number of requirements that the solution must fulfil, as expressed by the seeker in the RFP 
(Sieg et al., 2010; Wielens, 2013). These conditions may be related to physical characteristics 
(e.g., the dimension or weight of a new product/material) or to the functionality of the solution 
(Arranz and Arroyabe, 2012; Lopez-Vega et al., 2016). For example, focusing on a request for 
a new transparent material replacing glass in automobiles (NineSigma, 2014 – ID challenge 
REQ0247749), the seeker firm specified in the RFP that the new material must have (1) no 
performance degradation even after being used outdoors for 15 years; (2) a hardness rating 
greater than H; (3) a weight lower by 40% or more compared to glass; and (4) a visible light 
transmittance rate equal to 80% or more. In such a case, the variable Formulation assumes the 
value 4. Due to the skewness of the data, we used the logarithm of the variable.  
The Search space of the problem is a binary variable, measured by comparing the 
industry to which the seeker belongs and the technical areas of the challenge (Afuah and Tucci, 
2012; Lopez-Vega et al., 2016). If the knowledge related to the technical area of the problem 
does not overlap the knowledge possessed by the seeker, Search space assumes the value 1, 0 
otherwise. Consider, for example, a problem aimed at improving the properties of a resin 
(NineSigma, 2011 – ID challenge REQ1172128). Since it involves knowledge related to the 
chemical area, its search space overlaps the knowledge possessed by a seeker belonging to the 
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chemical industry. In such a case, the variable Search space assumes the value 0. Consider 
instead a problem related to the development of a new technology to print labels on cardboard 
containers used for shipping a company’s product (NineSigma, 2013 – ID challenge 
REQ7141960). Because this problem requires knowledge from mechanical engineering and 
information science, its search space does not overlap the knowledge possessed by a seeker 
belonging to the chemical industry. Thus in such a circumstance, the variable Search space 
assumes the value 1. 
We also include a number of control variables in our model. We control for the effect 
that the seeker’s industry (Seeker industry) has on the seeker’s governance considerations 
(Oxley, 1997) through seven dummy variables representing the core activities of seekers 
(Automotive and transportation, Chemicals and materials, Electronics and semiconductors, 
Food and beverage, Healthcare, Manufacturing and Other industries). Moreover, we control 
for the Technical area of the challenge through four dummies representing the main knowledge 
elements of the innovation problems broadcast on NineSigma (Engineering, Chemistry and 
material science, Healthcare science and Other areas). Moreover, since a seeker may prefer to 
address its challenge to a restricted pool of solvers according to their knowledge capabilities 
(Simula and Ahola, 2014), we control for this circumstance with the variable Pre-selection: a 
binary variable assuming the value 1 when the seeker decides to open its call to a smaller group 
of solvers opportunely selected, 0 otherwise. Furthermore, we control whether the seeker 
reveals to the solvers their preferences toward possible approaches to adopt in solving technical 
problems (Wielens, 2013; Lüttgens et al., 2014) through the variable Advice. Advice is 
operationalized as a continuous variable measuring the natural logarithm of the number of 
advice statements expressed by the seeker. Finally, we control for the possibility of the seeker 
providing financial support to the winning solver; Financial is a binary variable that assumes 
the value 1 if the seeker provides financial support to the winning solver, 0 otherwise. 
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ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Unilateral governance structure models an alternative between two possible 
occurrences, so both logit and probit models are appropriate; convenience and convention 
determine the choice between them (Long, 1997; Hoetker, 2007). We decide to apply a probit 
model. Moreover, as robustness check, we run the regression using the logit model, obtaining 
the same results. 
The descriptive statistics and the correlation values are provided in Table 1. The 
pairwise correlation matrix does not reveal any criticalities. Moreover, we used the variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) test to check for multicollinearity, and we found that no variable had a 
VIF greater than 6 (Stevens, 1992); therefore, multicollinearity is not a problem for this study.  
The probit estimation results are illustrated in Table 2. Starting with the control 
variables, we find in Model 1 that dummy variables indicating the industry of the seeker are all 
significant and negative, except for Food and beverage, meaning that seeker firms belonging 
to the significant industries do not have a preference toward unilateral governance structures 
compared to seekers operating in Other industries (omitted since used as a baseline category). 
Dummy variables indicating the Technical area of the challenge are not significant. 
Furthermore, Pre-selection is significant and has a positive impact, meaning that if the seeker 
addresses the challenge to a restricted group of solvers according to their knowledge 
capabilities, she/he has a preference toward unilateral governance structures. The control 
variable Advice is significant and has a negative coefficient, suggesting that firms which provide 
possible approaches to solve an innovation problem do not have a preference toward unilateral 
governance structures. Finally, the control variable Financial is not significant.  
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 Mean Std. dev. VIF (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(1) Unilateral governance structure 0.13 0.34 1.11 1                  
(2) Automotive and transportation 0.12 0.33 1.60 -0.05 1                 
(3) Chemicals and materials 0.14 0.35 1.66 0.0003 -0.15* 1                
(4) Electronics and semiconductors 0.12 0.32 1.58 -0.06 -0.14* -0.15* 1               
(5) Food and beverage 0.11 0.31 1.63 0.08 -0.13* -0.14* -0.13* 1              
(6) Healthcare 0.14 0.31 2.12 -0.10* -0.15* -0.16* -0.14* -0.14* 1             
(7) Manufacturing 0.19 0.39 1.78 -0.07 -0.18* -0.20* -0.18* -0.17* -0.19* 1            
(8) Engineering 0.35 0.48 2.63 -0.03 0.19* -0.12* 0.22* -0.19* -0.24* 0.13* 1           
(9) Chemistry and material science 0.33 0.47 2.62 0.008 -0.007 0.29* -0.13* -0.12* -0.15* 0.05 -0.51* 1          
(10) Healthcare science 0.15 0.36 2.34 -0.08 -0.14* -0.06 -0.14* -0.04 0.57* -0.08* -0.31* -0.29* 1         
(11) Pre-selection 0.14 0.35 1.25 0.09* 0.03 0.002 -0.09* 0.02 0.05 0.05 -0.07 -0.05 0.16* 1        
(12) Advice 1.44 0.70 1.13 -0.10* 0.001 0.06 -0.07 0.05 -0.11* 0.06 0.03 0.06 -0.10* -0.17* 1       
(13) Financial 0.80 0.40 4.68 -0.07 -0.08* -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.10* 0.03 0.04 -0.04 -0.12* 0.17* 1      
(14) Decomposability 1.13 0.37 1.05 -0.02 0.01 0.05 0.11* -0.06 -0.01 -0.06 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.12* -0.05 1     
(15) Formulation 2.00 0.72 1.10 0.04 -0.08 0.02 -0.04 -0.08 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.07 -0.02 -0.35* 0.12* 0.19* 0.04 1    
(16) Search space 0.20 0.40 1.12 0.10* 0.06 0.03 -0.07 0.04 -0.02 -0.08 0.002 -0.05 -0.15* -0.07 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.12* 1   
(17) Timeline phases 1.84 0.63 1.20 -0.04 -0.008 0.04 -0.04 -0.09* -0.07 0.0009 0.07 0.10* -0.11* -0.17* 0.10* 0.25* 0.001 0.31* 0.03 1  
(18) Words 4.26 1.27 4.41 0.01 -0.06 0.02 -0.04 -0.06 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.08 -0.01 -0.35* 0.10* 0.13* 0.03 0.88* 0.09* 0.23* 1 
* p < 0.05 
                     
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
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 Preference toward unilateral governance structure 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Seeker industry      
    Automotive and transportation -0.861** -0.863** -0.820** -0.888*** -0.844** 
 (0.265) (0.265) (0.272) (0.267) (0.272) 
   Chemicals and materials -0.532* -0.530* -0.546* -0.567* -0.567* 
 (0.233) (0.233) (0.232) (0.228) (0.228) 
   Electronics and semiconductors -0.916*** -0.913** -0.882** -0.874** -0.842** 
 (0.278) (0.279) (0.278) (0.278) (0.281) 
   Food and beverage -0.306 -0.312 -0.283 -0.293 -0.284 
 (0.247) (0.247) (0.249) (0.245) (0.248) 
   Healthcare -1.023*** -1.019** -1.108*** -1.055*** -1.132*** 
 (0.311) (0.310) (0.311) (0.310) (0.313) 
   Manufacturing -0.818*** -0.820*** -0.814*** -0.805*** -0.806*** 
 (0.223) (0.223) (0.225) (0.223) (0.225) 
Technical area of the challenge      
   Engineering -0.113 -0.114 -0.231 -0.0702 -0.193 
 (0.218) (0.218) (0.219) (0.213) (0.216) 
   Chemistry and material science -0.105 -0.107 -0.182 -0.0248 -0.117 
 (0.218) (0.218) (0.221) (0.214) (0.220) 
   Healthcare science -0.434 -0.435 -0.515+ -0.318 -0.415 
 (0.298) (0.298) (0.289) (0.296) (0.290) 
Pre-selection 0.336+ 0.339+ 0.567** 0.358+ 0.576** 
 (0.184) (0.183) (0.201) (0.185) (0.201) 
Financial -0.226 -0.233 -0.305+ -0.250 -0.333* 
 (0.164) (0.162) (0.166) (0.164) (0.163) 
Advice -0.225* -0.220* -0.257** -0.214* -0.240* 
 (0.0950) (0.0974) (0.0971) (0.0950) (0.0996) 
Decomposability  -0.0624   -0.113 
  (0.198)   (0.203) 
Formulation   0.349**  0.327** 
   (0.110)  (0.109) 
Search space    0.312* 0.255+ 
    (0.163) (0.165) 
_cons -0.0151 0.0545 -0.591+ -0.138 -0.525 
 (0.258) (0.309) (0.318) (0.260) (0.365) 
N 582 582 582 582 582 
Log-pseudolikelihood -204.33 -204.29 -200.22 -202.68 -199.06 
Wald chi2 46.54 47.74 54.90 48.56 59.39 
Pseudo R2 0.1015 0.1017 0.1196 0.1088 0.1247 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Table 2. Results of probit estimations 
 
In Model 2 the independent variable Decomposability is not significant, thus H1 is not 
supported. Model 3 supports H2, since the coefficient of the independent variable Formulation 
is significant and positive. In Model 4 the coefficient of the independent variable Search space 
is significant and positive, contrary to what we hypothesized in H3. Finally Model 5, which 
includes all of the independent variables, confirms the previous results by supporting hypothesis 
H2 but not H1 or H3.  
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Our data shows that some seekers do not have a preference between unilateral and 
bilateral governance structures at the moment the challenge is broadcast. However, choosing a 
specific governance structure to manage the working relationship with the winning solver is 
predicated on the development of a preference. Because we examine RFPs from the time the 
challenge was broadcast, our regression analysis does not take into account later self-selection 
for a preferred governance structure and may result in biased coefficient estimates due to 
omitted variables that affect both the development of a preference and the resulting outcome 
(Hamilton and Nickerson 2003). For this reason, following Jeppesen and Lakhani (2010), we 
control for sample selection bias using a probit model with sample selection correction (Van de 
Ven and Van Praag, 1981). This model is an extension of the Heckman model (Heckman 1979).  
The original Heckman model assumes a binary choice for selection into the sample and a 
continuous outcome for the main dependent variable, while its extension takes into account the 
statistical properties of a two-stage discrete choice estimation (Heckman 1979). Given that 
governance considerations about the seeker-solver working relationship consist of two binary 
outcomes – (1) the presence or absence of a preference toward a specific governance structure 
and (2) having a preference toward a unilateral or bilateral governance structure – the adapted 
version of the Heckman model will be more appropriate than its traditional version.  
The results of two-stage probit estimations with the Heckman correction are reported in 
Table 3. The first stage models the process of the selection into the sample, i.e., the presence or 
absence of a preference toward a specific governance structure; the second stage models the 
binary choice between a unilateral or bilateral governance structure and includes an error 
correction term obtained from the first stage estimation. Performing the Heckman correction, 





 First stage: developing a 
preference 
Second stage: unilateral vs. 
bilateral preference 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 
Seeker industry       
Automotive and transportation -0.321 -0.328 -0.343 -2.757*** -2.570** -2.182*** 
 (0.232) (0.229) (0.234) (0.621) (0.867) (0.571) 
Chemicals and material -0.432+ -0.435+ -0.457* -1.843** -2.245* -1.077+ 
 (0.225) (0.226) (0.221) (0.699) (0.961) (0.621) 
Electronics and semiconductors -0.713** -0.719** -0.685** -2.640** -2.758* -1.486* 
 (0.257) (0.256) (0.256) (0.918) (1.185) (0.683) 
Food and beverage -0.045 -0.041 -0.031 -1.538* -1.912** -1.440* 
 (0.228) (0.228) (0.226) (0.602) (0.678) (0.625) 
Healthcare -1.040*** -1.040*** -1.052*** -2.480* -2.297 -0.877 
 (0.287) (0.287) (0.284) (1.139) (1.719) (0.774) 
Manufacturing -0.668** -0.667** -0.654** -2.112** -2.181+ -1.008+ 
 (0.209) (0.209) (0.209) (0.751) (1.174) (0.609) 
Technical area of the challenge       
Engineering -0.228 -0.220 -0.183 -0.329 -0.715 0.082 
 (0.208) (0.209) (0.205) (0.511) (0.712) (0.447) 
Chemistry and material science -0.164 -0.158 -0.103 -0.305 -0.840 0.047 
 (0.207) (0.209) (0.204) (0.529) (0.727) (0.476) 
Healthcare science -0.053 -0.049 0.036 -1.435* -2.516*** -1.181* 
 (0.254) (0.256) (0.255) (0.571) (0.763) (0.553) 
Pre-selection 0.529** 0.516** 0.547*** 0.399 1.030 -0.497 
 (0.163) (0.171) (0.165) (0.717) (0.940) (0.361) 
Financial -0.251 -0.243 -0.265+ -0.569 -0.787 -0.069 
 (0.155) (0.157) (0.155) (0.469) (0.555) (0.363) 
Advice -0.218* -0.222* -0.214* -0.446 -0.686 -0.073 
 (0.092) (0.090) (0.090) (0.311) (0.510) (0.226) 
Decomposability -0.066   -0.241   
 (0.189)   (0.452)   
Formulation  -0.015+   1.407***  
  (0.090)   (0.338)  
Search space   0.265+   0.694+ 
   (0.154)   (0.355) 
Selection correction term    5.406 3.739 7.258*** 
    (3.657) (5.268) (0.469) 
Constant 0.115 0.068 -0.061 -0.083 -0.644 -3.850*** 
 (0.300) (0.283) (0.247) (2.103) (2.794) (0.599) 
N 582 582 582 129 129 129 
Log-pseudolikelihood -248.20 -248.25 -246.89 -45.89 -33.53 -46.17 
Wald chi2 54.21 53.18 55.02 29.95 40.19 90.38 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Table 3. Results of probit estimations with sample selection correction 
Focusing on the second stage, in Model 4 the independent variable Decomposability is not 
significant, thus H1 is not supported. Model 5 supports H2 since the coefficient of the 
independent variable Formulation is significant and positive, meaning that when the problem 
is easy to formulate, seekers develop a preference toward a unilateral governance structure 
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compared to a bilateral one. In Model 4 the coefficient of the independent variable Search space 
is significant and positive meaning that, contrary to what we hypothesized in H3, when 
searching for solutions that are distant from their knowledge bases, seekers prefer unilateral 
governance structures over bilateral ones.  
 
Post-hoc endogeneity analysis  
Endogeneity occurs for several reasons, such as measurement errors, simultaneity or 
reverse causality, and omitted variable bias (Wooldridge, 2002; Abdallah et al., 2015). In our 
study, reverse causality is not plausible; it would not be possible for a seeker who prefers to 
manage the working relationship through specific governance structures to change the attributes 
of the technical problem she/he is attempting to solve. In fact, the attributes of the technical 
problem, such as the decomposability, the formulation and the search space of the problem 
(Afuah and Tucci, 2012; Felin and Zenger, 2014), are intrinsic characteristics of the problem 
itself; they are given and cannot be changed by the seeker. In turn, omitted variables bias may 
be a real concern in our model and could increase the effect that Decomposability, Formulation 
and Search space have on the dependent variable. 
To adequately address endogeneity concerns related to our independent variables, we 
used the instrumental variable (IV) method (Wooldridge, 2002; Hamilton and Nickerson, 
2003). We used two different instruments, Timeline phases and Words. Timeline phases 
exogenously influences Formulation and Search space, but it does not affect the dependent 
variable, Unilateral governance structure. Timeline phases measures the number of phases 
through which the seeker regulates the timeline for the winning solver to develop the proposed 
solution. Each phase of the timeline is defined by intermediate results the solver has to reach, 
allowing seekers to assess the solvers’ knowledge and skills step-by-step; this enables the 
seeker to assess if the solution effectively solves the technical problem and whether the solver 
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possesses the knowledge required to solve the innovation problem (Koza and Lewin, 2000). 
Following Plourde et al. (2014), we validated the instrument; Timeline phases significantly and 
negatively affects the variables Decomposability (β=0.28 with p-value=0.000) and Search 
space (β=0.32 with p-value=0.002), while Unilateral governance structure does not (p-
value=0.320). The second instrument, Words, exogenously influences the variable Formulation 
but does not affect the dependent variable, Unilateral governance structure. Specifically, 
Words measures the number of words used by a seeker to express the conditions that the 
solution must fulfil. As stressed by Gefen et al. (2016), the seeker uses the length of the 
description of requirements to better describe the innovation problem. We found that Words is 
a valid instrument, as Words significantly and positively affects Formulation (β=0.49 with p-
value=0.000) while Unilateral governance structure does not (p=0.73).  
Because Search space is a binary variable, while Decomposability and Formulation are 
not, we used different IV techniques tailored to these variables to perform our endogeneity 
analysis. Specifically, in order to treat endogeneity related to Decomposability (H1) and 
Formulation (H2), we used the IV probit estimation procedure (Wooldridge, 2002), as done in 
previous studies (e.g., Plourde et al., 2014). Table 4 shows that IV probit estimations produce 
the same results as the standard probit estimation (Table 2). Moreover, the insignificant Wald 
test also indicates in this case that endogeneity concerns do not affect Decomposability and 
Formulation (Wooldridge, 2002). Moreover, following previous scholars (e.g., Fairlie, 2006), 
we adopted the bivariate probit estimation approach (Angrist, 2001) in order to treat 
endogeneity related to Search space (H3). Bivariate probit estimation solves our potential 
endogeneity concerns by simultaneously estimating two probit models, as shown in the last two 
columns of Table 4. Bivariate probit produces the same results as the standard probit estimation 
(Table 2). Most importantly, such a procedure also returns a Wald test to check for the existence 
of exogeneity (Monfardini and Radice, 2008); the Wald exogeneity test is insignificant, 
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meaning that endogeneity concerns do not affect Search space (Wooldridge, 2002). Thus, the 
post-hoc endogeneity analysis provides consistency with previous results and so validates our 
interpretations. 
 
 IV probit (H1)  IV probit (H2)  Bivariate probit (H3) 
 Unilateral  
governance  
structure 
 Unilateral  
governance  
structure 





Seeker industry       
   Automotive and transportation -0.860**  -0.822**  -0.835** 0.282 
 (0.264)  (0.272)  (0.257) (0.227) 
   Chemicals and materials -0.540*  -0.546*  -0.584** 0.283 
 (0.232)  (0.232)  (0.209) (0.216) 
   Electronics and semiconductors -0.937***  -0.884**  -0.642* -0.429+ 
 (0.276)  (0.278)  (0.302) (0.260) 
   Food and beverage -0.308  -0.285  -0.194 -0.153 
 (0.247)  (0.249)  (0.246) (0.263) 
   Healthcare -1.022***  -1.108***  -1.079*** 0.149 
 (0.309)  (0.311)  (0.303) (0.276) 
   Manufacturing -0.812***  -0.815***  -0.653** -0.181 
 (0.222)  (0.225)  (0.236) (0.218) 
Technical area of the challenge       
   Engineering -0.126  -0.231  0.142 -
0.647*** 
 (0.215)  (0.219)  (0.219) (0.195) 
   Chemistry and material science -0.112  -0.182  0.272 -
0.833*** 
 (0.217)  (0.221)  (0.234) (0.203) 
   Healthcare science -0.440  -0.517+  0.0907 -
1.446*** 
 (0.296)  (0.288)  (0.332) (0.355) 
Pre-selection 0.332+  0.557**  0.397* -0.0896 
 (0.183)  (0.203)  (0.175) (0.199) 
Financial -0.227  -0.304+  -0.288+ 0.181 
 (0.161)  (0.166)  (0.150) (0.156) 
Advice -0.232*  -0.253**  -0.158+ -0.137 
 (0.0990)  (0.0962)  (0.0940) (0.0914) 
Decomposability 0.0879      
 (0.320)      
Formulation   0.330**    
   (0.116)    
Search space     1.630**  
     (0.617)  
Phase timeline      0.376*** 
      (0.105) 
_cons -0.0909  -0.557+  -0.620+ -0.404+ 
 (0.401)  (0.336)  (0.325) (0.241) 
N 582  582  582 582 
Log-pseudolikelihood -303.69  -212.33  -459.51  
Wald chi2 46.99  53.72  163.43  
Prob>chi2 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Wald exogeneity test 0.36  0.09  2.06  
The critical value of the Wald exogeneity test at a significance of 0.05 is 3.84; the null hypotheses are exogenesis of 
Decomposability, Formulation and Search space. In the IV probit estimations Decomposability is instrumented with the 
variable Phase timeline, while Formulation is instrumented with the instrumental variable Words. 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Table 4. Results of endogeneity analysis 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Analyzing detailed data gathered from 582 challenges broadcast on the NineSigma 
platform we get three main results from the empirical investigation. First, we provided 
confirmation that well-delineated innovation problems lead seekers to prefer unilateral 
governance structures to manage the working relationship with the winning solver. This finding 
suggests that when problems can be easily formulated, the constitution of more complex 
organizational structures that allow the integration of omitted tacit knowledge is unnecessarily 
onerous. Thus, since in such a case the seeker does not need to offer additional information to 
the description of the problem in the RFP document for increasing the value of the solution 
proposals, they can benefit from a more efficient and less costly unilateral governance structure.  
Second, we did not find support for the negative relationship between an innovation 
problem characterized by a distant search space and the seeker’s preference toward unilateral 
governance structures. On the contrary, we found a positive relationship, meaning that when 
seekers engage in crowdsourcing activities to acquire knowledge distant from their existing 
capabilities, they have preferences toward unilateral governance structures. A possible 
explanation for this counterintuitive finding may be that crowdsourcing contests are often used 
by organizations to more effectively and efficiently search for and absorb knowledge in 
unfamiliar areas (Afuah and Tucci, 2012). Developing new capabilities in areas in which a firm 
has none, or which are relatively distant from the firm’s core competences, may be very 
difficult, costly, and time consuming (March, 1991). In dealing with a solution related to a 
search space that does not involve familiar knowledge elements, seekers cannot leverage their 
existing capabilities and so face the risk of being unable to absorb and integrate the new 
knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Under these circumstances, the seeker may prefer not 
to enter into a committed, costly and time consuming relationship with a bilateral governance 
structure, thus preferring unilateral ones. This is in line with the Real Option perspective that 
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generally encourages firms to delay demanding investments characterized by a high level of 
uncertainty and establish less committed relationships that enable companies to withdraw from 
the investment at any point in time (Folta, 1998; Dalziel 2009). Relationships with unilateral 
governance structures allow the seeker to learn about the new and unfamiliar knowledge and, 
at the same time, develop the absorptive capacity necessary to integrate it without engaging in 
a time and cost consuming investment (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Kogut and Kulatilaka, 
2001; van de Vrande et al., 2006). As such, seekers facing the risks related to a distant 
knowledge search may use unilateral governance structures to learn about the new and the 
unfamiliar knowledge while evaluating the decision to enter into more committed relationships 
with a bilateral governance structure (Kogut, 1991; Folta and Miller, 2002). The lower level of 
commitment offered by unilateral governance structures may thus overcome the benefits related 
to mechanisms of knowledge transfer offered by bilateral ones when engaging in 
crowdsourcing exploratory activities (Folta, 1998; Mayer and Salomon, 2006). 
Finally, we did not find empirical confirmation of the effect that the decomposability of 
the innovation problem has on seekers’ preference toward alternative governance structures. 
Such a non-significant result could be due to the supporting role offered by the NineSigma 
crowdsourcing platform in the evaluation process of solution proposals. In fact, as also emerged 
from the qualitative evidence we gathered through our interviews, NineSigma managers assist 
seekers in screening all solution proposals and selecting the winning one. Thus seekers who 
trust the intermediary role played by the platform in understanding the knowledge related to the 
solutions and assessing their quality may not be influenced by the decomposability of the 
problem when evaluating the governance structure of the crowdsourcing relationship. 
 
Contribution to literature and practice 
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Examining the match between problem attributes and appropriate working 
relationships, this paper contributes to the literature streams on innovation crowdsourcing and 
makes two interesting contributions.  
First, we enrich the discussion in the literature by providing evidence that seekers have 
preferences toward specific governance structures for managing the working relationship with 
the winning solver. Although growing scholarly attention has been paid towards crowdsourcing 
governance implications (e.g., Pénin and Burger-Helmchen, 2011; Afuah and Tucci, 2012; 
Poetz and Schreier, 2012; Malhotra and Majchrzak, 2014; Nickerson et al., 2017), previous 
studies have neglected to investigate the governance structure that manages the seeker-solver 
working relationship. Our main findings are that well-delineated innovation problems and the 
distance of the knowledge from a solver’s existing knowledge capabilities tend to act as 
complements in specific governance structure decisions. The literature from the problem-
solving perspective suggests that governance structure decisions associated with innovation 
contests are specified up front and most appropriate to solve well-defined, decomposable, or 
simple (i.e., non-complex) problems (Felin and Zenger, 2014) by providing a prize award 
instead of a property rights agreement (i.e., a licensing or contractual agreement). Our findings 
appear to contradict available research in innovation contests; we argue that the problem 
attributes can vary from well-structured, well-defined, simple and decomposable problems to 
poorly-structured, less defined, complex and less decomposable problems based on the needs 
of the seeker’s organization, which then match the seeker’s governance choice selection. Our 
findings suggest that the working relationship between seekers and solvers goes beyond 
governance, fulfilling a coordinating role of aligning seeker and solver expectations; this role 
does not necessarily conflict with the design of crowdsourcing for innovation contests in 
relation to problem attributes.  
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Second, governance structure decisions in innovation contests has rarely been studied 
with the lenses of problem-solving perspective and the knowledge-based view, yet we provide 
systematic evidence that governance structure decisions vary significantly in ways consistent 
with knowledge requirements, defined as the key underlying features of the problem attributes 
governed by the seeker. We believe these two views have complementary potential in 
investigating knowledge-governance considerations in the crowdsourcing context. Even if 
governance issues addressed by the knowledge-based view are limited to keeping knowledge 
within a firm, this view is indeed very helpful in illustrating the central role of knowledge 
creation and management in sustaining a firm’s competitive advantage (Leiblein, 2003). In 
addition, whilst the problem-solving perspective is a useful lens to explain how organizations 
generate value while they define, create and solve problems, this view is too firm-centric and 
focuses on what problems the organizations are required to resolve and when (Felin and Zenger, 
2016). The problem-solving perspective needs to more effectively incorporate seeker 
organizational resources and knowledge; scholars utilizing a knowledge-based perspective 
should also consider how different types of governance may affect knowledge transfer and 
protection. Instead of seeing the knowledge-based view and problem-solving perspectives as 
contradictory, this study explores how they can inform one another through examination of a 
topic common to both: how governance decisions are affected by the characteristics of problem 
related to the knowledge required for developing, evaluating and transferring a solution.  
In addition, even if the complementarity of the problem-solving perspective and the 
knowledge-based view has shown potential in investigating governance issues, we believe they 
are not sufficient to explain the complex process of knowledge transfer between the seeker and 
solver in the crowdsourcing context. In fact, to explain the unexpected and counterintuitive 
result related to the relationship between the search space of the problem and the governance 
structure preferred by the seeker, we also needed to invoke the Real Option theory (Folta, 1998). 
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Different from the knowledge-based view and the problem-solving perspective, the Real Option 
approach emphasizes the role played by uncertainty in affecting governance structure decisions 
(Leiblein, 2003). When the transfer of knowledge involves a distant and unfamiliar search, 
seekers may lack the capabilities to absorb the new knowledge from the crowd and may be 
unable to integrate it with their exiting knowledge base (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). In such a 
case, seekers have to also include uncertainty considerations related to the value they can 
capture from the winning solution in their governance decisions. Including these considerations 
in their decision processes, seekers may prefer a unilateral governance structure as an initial 
investment to experiment with the distant knowledge of the winning solution and then evaluate 
the possibility of following up on this investment with a more committed governance structure. 
Thus, the knowledge-based view and the problem-solving perspective offer better predictions 
for the preferred governance structure when considering the tacit knowledge related to the 
problem broadcast, while the Real Option theory provides better support when considering the 
risks a seeker faces when engaging in distant knowledge searches. In conclusion, governance 
considerations in the crowdsourcing context need to be investigated under several theoretical 
approaches to take on board all the complex aspects characterizing the transfer of knowledge 
between the seeker and the solver. 
The results of this study also present important implications for managers who design 
crowdsourcing for innovation contests. Firms’ managers have to match their decisions about a 
governance structure to manage the crowdsourcing relationship with the attributes of the 
problem they are attempting to solve. In particular, managers should prefer bilateral governance 
structures (e.g., a joint development contract) when they cannot provide the crowd an accurate 
formulation of the problem at the moment it is broadcast. In such a circumstance, in fact, more 
interaction and face-to-face personal contact between seekers and solvers is required to 
communicate to the winning solver certain knowledge that is not possible to codify through 
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writing or drawing. Further, managers should govern the crowdsourcing relationship through 
unilateral structures when pursuing the objective of insourcing knowledge that is located far 
away from their knowledge competencies. In such a case, since seekers may not be able to 
assess the true value of the solution and absorb the related knowledge, it could be preferable to 
firstly engage in a less committed investment to start exploring unfamiliar knowledge and then 
evaluate more costly and tighter relationships. Finally, seekers should not be concerned about 
the decomposability of the problem when evaluating the governance structure of crowdsourcing 
relationships. Specifically, seekers have to be aware of the role of the crowdsourcing platform 
in helping them to evaluate solution proposals involving interrelated components of knowledge 
and to develop a common language to share knowledge with the winning solver. 
 
Limitations and future research 
Despite providing interesting arguments and empirical results, we must still consider 
certain limitations. First of all, we tested our hypotheses through secondary data. The major 
limitation related to secondary data is that no new constructs of interest may be added, as the 
archival data already exists. Moreover, seekers are often flexible with regard to the specific 
governance structure as an outcome of an RFP and may be willing to accept a variety of forms 
of collaboration. Thus, a governance structure could be administered in a number of different 
ways, with varying degrees of collaboration, following the selection of a specific proposal. A 
better-grounded analysis of the proposed relationships and challenge attributes could be 
explored via in-depth longitudinal case research. 
Finally, this study focuses on a platform for innovation competitions (NineSigma). 
Although the context is surely the most appropriate for the issue under investigation, it would 
be unwise to broadly generalize our findings to either other crowdsourcing platforms for 
innovation competitions (e.g., InnoCentive or Yet2) or crowdsourcing platforms for idea 
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competitions (e.g., CrowdSPRING or 99designs), which award monetary rewards to winning 
solvers instead of establishing seeker-solver working relationships. 
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